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FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL WELFARE
CLAIMS
At the present time the most significant efforts toward welfare
reform are proceeding in two federal forums, the federal courts
and the Congress. Since 1968 the greatest strides in the assertion of
both constitutional and statutory welfare rights have been taken in
the federal courts.' Congressional efforts toward reform have been
directed at federalization of the assistance programs. 2 On January
1, 1974, all the adult welfare categories were combined into the
single federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program;' a
national minimum benefit level was established; 4 and the trouble5
some grant-in-aid structure was for the most part eliminated.
There is, however, an unforeseen and unfortunate by-product
of this federalizing reform. As welfare programs become more
federalized, there is less jurisdictional ground for promptly challenging illegal agency policies in federal courts. In the past, most
welfare litigation 6 was brought in the context of section 1983 civil
rights claims.7 The jurisdictional counterpart to section 1983, secSee, e.g., United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (congressional definition of food-stamp household as including related persons only violates due
process); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971) (Illinois's attempt to exclude otherwise
eligible dependent college students from AFDC eligibility violates Social Security Act);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process mandates notice and prior hearing
before welfare benefits are terminated); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama
regulation denying AFDC to families with substitute father violates Social Security Act).
2 See, e.g., Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-The Supplemental Security Income
Program, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 827-28 (1975); H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
(Family Assistance Plan). Although never enacted, FAP is discussed at length in R. LEVY, T.
LEWIS & P. MARTIN, SOCIAL WELFARE AND THE INDIVIDUAL 753-61 (1971).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (Supp. 111, 1973). See generally, 1974 Developments in Welfare
Law-The Supplemental Security Income Program, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 825 (1975); Developments
in Welfare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 859, 880-92 (1974); Note, Welfare Law-1972
Social Security Amendments-Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 58
CORNELL L. REV. 803 (1973).

4 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
' For a discussion of the grant-in-aid system, see generally, R. LEVY, T. LEWIS & P.
MARTIN, supra note 2, at 75-100. The funding problems created by such a system are
discussed at id. 96-100.
6 See, e.g., note 1 supra.
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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tion 1343(3), 8 gives the federal courts jurisdiction over all cases
involving state deprivations of constitutional rights. There is no
jurisdictional-amount requirement in section 1343(3). As a result,
whenever welfare programs are state administered, challenges to
illegal agency practices are justiciable in the federal courts as long as
a colorable constitutional claim is present. But this is not so when
programs are federally administered. The Social Security Act provides for ultimate judicial review of agency determinations for both
Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (0ASDI) and SSI. 9
However, this statutory judicial review is so slow that welfare
litigants are often seriously harmed by the delay.' 0 In addition,
some cases may be rendered non-justiciable by the intervening
administrative review; by the time the courts could hear the case, it
would necessarily be moot." Sections 1983 and 1343(3) are inapplicable where state deprivation of constitutional rights is not

I

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by
law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
The mechanics of § 1343(3).and the problems associated with invoking federal jurisdiction under that section are discussed in Note, FederalJurisdiction Over Challenges to State
Welfare Programs, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1404 (1972). In 1974 the Supreme Court defined the
proper scope and use of § 1343(3). Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). See Note, The
Outlookfor Welfare LitigationIn The Federal Courts: Hagans v. Lavine & Edelman v. Jordon, 60
CORNELL L. REV. 897, 898-903 (1975).
An interesting reverse twist to federal jurisdiction under § 1343(3) was discovered by
the district court in Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). That case was a
Goldberg-type challenge to the SS1 procedure of terminations without a prior hearing. The
court found sufficient state action to warrant § 1343(3) jurisdiction primarily on the basis of
state funding of supplementary benefits and state agency interaction with the Social Security
Administration. In New York the supplementary benefits dre federally administered; payments are made through the Social Security Administration. Id. at 254. Clearly, payments
made directly by a state agency would be sufficient state action to warrant § 1343(3)
jurisdiction. Thus, under the Lyons approach, all SSI litigation in a state making supplementary payments would fit within the § 1343(3) ground rules. For an analysis of the substantive
aspects of the Lyons decision, see Note, 1974 Developments in Welfare Law-The Supplemental Security Income Program, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 825, 835-36 (1975).
9 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) (OASDI); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (Supp. III, 1973) (SSI).
10 See notes 27-29 and accompanying text infra.
I1 A good example of this dilemma is the due process litigation discussed at notes 17-19
and accompanying text infra. Where social security recipients assert their rights to notice and
prior hearings before their benefits are reduced or terminated, they obviously need immediate judicial review. If the courts require administrative hearings before they consent to
rule on the constitutional questions, these constitutional questions become moot and nonjusticiable. See Mills v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1972).
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involved. Furthermore, there is no analogous statute granting
federal jurisdiction over claims offederal deprivations of constitutional rights.1 2 This anomoly leaves federal welfare recipients without timely federal redress for the unconstitutional and illegal
actions of federal officers.
Federal adjudication of both constitutional and statutory federal welfare claims is necessary for two reasons: 3 (1) there is a need
for uniformity in the developing federal law;1 4 and (2) the Social
Security Act and accompanying federal regulations are so complex
that proper adjudication of welfare claims can only occur in courts
which have developed a degree of expertise in the field. There is
the additional federal interest in seeing that large federal welfare
expenditures are properly administered. Moreover, there is no
important state interest served by allowing state courts to resolve
these matters; federal questions predominate in all federal welfare
litigation. Although federal court dockets are exceedingly
crowded,1 5 foreclosure of federal adjudication of the rights of
indigent persons is not the proper solution to this problem. The
Supreme Court has explicitly stated that it is "peculiarly

.

.

the

1 6
duty" of the Court to resolve this type of dispute.
The present state of the law concerning federal jurisdiction to
17
hear federal welfare claims is chaotic. After Goldberg v. Kelly,
several cases challenging Social Security procedures for benefit
termination and reduction without a prior hearing arose in the
federal courts.1 8 In most of these cases, there was no discussion of
12 Although all constitutional and statutory challenges to illegal federal welfare practices obviously turn on the resolution of federal law, federal-question jurisdiction historically
has been barred by the jurisdictional-amount requirement, now $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)
(1970). Without this $10,000 hurdle, welfare litigants would have no problem in redressing
their grievances in federal court. Various methods for overcoming this $10,000 hurdle are
discussed in notes 54-99 and accompanying text infra.
's See also Herzer, FederalJurisdictionover Statutorily-Based Welfare Claims, 6 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REv. '1, 9-12 (1970); Redlich, The Art of Welfare Advocacy: Available
Proceduresand Forums, 36 ALBANY L. REv. 57, 85-86 (1971); Note, COLUM. L. REv., supra note
8, at 1404-05.
14 See Note, COLUM. L. REv., supra note 8, at 1405.
15 See Cramton, FederalAppellateJustice in 1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 571, 578-81 (1974);
Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 634 (1974).
16 [W]e find not the slightest indication that Congress meant to deprive federal courts
of their traditional jurisdiction to hear and decide federal questions in this field....
It is... peculiarly part of the duty of this tribunal, no less in the welfare field than in
other areas of the law, to resolve disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the
States are being expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has
attached to their use.
Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970).
17 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
18 See, e.g., Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1971). Wright was representative of
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federal jurisdiction and it is inferable that the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) conceded the jurisdictional
issue. In cases relitigating the issue within the past two years,
however, the jurisdictional questions have surfaced with no consistent pattern of resolution. 19
In 1973 the Supreme Court held that an attempt by Congress
to define an eligible food-stamp household as comprised only of
related persons violated the equal protection guarantees of the
fifth amendment's due process clause. 2 ° In this instance, the Court
did not discuss the question of federal jurisdiction, apparently
reflecting satisfaction with the approach taken by the three-judge
panel below. That court had found jurisdiction premised on
section 1337.21 Since then, a 1974 Supreme Court decision has
openly acknowledged the indefinite nature of the jurisdictional law
applicable to this area. In holding that the Veterans' Readjustment
Benefits Act of 196622 could not preclude judicial review of alleged
constitutional violations, the Court noted that jurisdiction was
invoked below pursuant to sections 1331, 1337, 1343, and 1361.23
The Court did not state whether this "shotgun" approach to
jurisdiction implied alternative or cumulative statutory grounds.
The result of this confusion is that the federal welfare litigant
several cases decided or pending in the lower federal courts that were cited by the Supreme
Court in Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 212-13 n.1 (1972). While the decision of the
three-judge district court in Wright v. Finch, holding the Social Security procedure violative of
due process, was being appealed, the Social Security Administration changed its hearing
regulations. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment below, hoping that the
administrative action would solve the problem and free the Court from deciding the constitutional issue. Id. at 209.
19 The Supreme Court's hopes inRichardsonhave not materialized. A second generation of
Goldberg-type challenges to the Social Security procedures has arisen in the lower federal
courts. Some district courts'have dismissed all plaintiffs' allegedjurisdictional grounds. See, e.g.,
Finnerty v. Weinberger, IA UNEMPL. INS. REP. 17,670 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1974); Knuckles v.
Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Other district courts have found jurisdiction
under one or more of the following alleged grounds: 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970); 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(1970); and 5 U.S.C. § 701-06 (1970). See, e.g., Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y.
1974).
20 United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). 'The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ofany civil
action or proceeding arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting
trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." Id. In order to find jurisdiction under
§ 1337, the three-judge court emphasized the beneficial impact of the food stamp program on
the national agriculture industry. Moreno v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 345 F. Supp.
310, 312-13 (D.D.C. 1972).
22 Act of March 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-358, 80 Stat. 12 (codified in scattered sections of38
U.S.C.).
2 28 U.S.C. §9 1331, 1337, 1343, 1361 (1970).Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,366 n.7
(1974). See notes 30-35 and accompanying text infra.
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is understandably insecure about his ability to get into federal
court. At present, it is impossible to predict whether the courts will
willingly invoke jurisdiction or whether strict construction of past
doctrine will be used to foreclose jurisdiction.
Although seven jurisdictional grounds have been asserted in
recently litigated cases,2 4 this Note will focus on the two grounds
with the most promise for federal welfare litigants, section 1331(a)
(federal question), and section 1361 (mandamus). However, it is
first necessary to discuss two threshold problems: (1) the general
availability of judicial review, and (2) the timing of such review and
the related doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
I
AVAILABILITY AND TIMING OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Two preliminary questions in any challenge to welfare agency
practices are whether judicial review of the agency action is available, and if so, at what point such review is proper. Both the OASD1
and SSI programs provide for judicial review in the district courts
24

5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1337, 1343(3), 1343(4), 1346(2), 1361

(1970). Many welfare litigants include jurisdictional allegations based on the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). Although the APA will not be discussed in
detail in this Note, it deserves some mention.
The broad language of§ 702 of the APA seems to provide anindependent basis for federal
jurisdiction. "A person sufferinglegal wrong because of agency action... is entitled to judicial
review thereof." Id. § 702. However, since HEW provides for eventual judicial review of its
decisions (see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) (OASDI)), it is not clear whether the APA is thereby
satisfied, or whether it independently assures welfare litigants of judicial review. There is a
further complication. Only final federal agency action is reviewable, not preliminary or intermediate rulings. Id. § 704. Thus, it is again unclear whether the litigant must wait for the
complex hierarchy of administrative review provided by HEW before there is a final and
judicially reviewable decision.
According to the Supreme Court, the APA instituted no changes in the common law of
reviewability. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). Thus, it would
seem that the APA does not constitute a new and independent ground for federal jurisdiction.
The Second Circuit has stated that neither it nor the Supreme Court has expressly acknowledged an independent grant ofjurisdiction under the APA. Mills v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 995,
1001 n.9 (2d Cir. 1972).
Nevertheless, not all courts are convinced. One district court has indicated that a number of
decisions involving the standing oflitigants to raise claims under the APA strongly suggest that
the APA was intended to provide an independentjurisdictiona ground. Lyons v. Weinberger,
376 F. Supp. 248, 255-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). A recent case in the District of Columbia Circuit has
expressly held that the APA provides such an independentjurisdictional basis. Pickus v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Contra, Zimmerman v. United
States Gov't, 422 F.2d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1970); Jamieson v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 291 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
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of final agency determinations made by HEW. 2 5 The statutes do
not define, however, what constitutes a final decision by the Secretary. These statutory provisions clearly contemplate review of individual determinations where questions of fact predominate. In
such cases, for example Social Security disability claims, postponing
judicial review is logical. 26 Problems arise, however, when HEW
asserts that these statutory provisions are the exclusive avenues for
judicial review in all cases, including constitutional or statutory
challenges to the welfare system itself.
Although the Social Security Act presently provides for ultimate judicial review, it is not inconceivable that Congress may at
27
some time attempt to preclude judicial review of welfare cases.
Other benefit distribution programs have such preclusive provisions today.2 8 For welfare recipients, however, the statutory review
scheme in effect functions to preclude judicial review. Regulations
promulgated by HEW provide for a four-tiered system of administrative review before the recipient gets into court. 2 9 As welfare
recipients are by definition indigent, any delay in the receipt of
benefits has potentially drastic consequences; a reduction in assistance often results in a deprivation of food or shelter. Obviously,
indigent recipients have no savings to rely on while they await
HEW's complex administrative review and need prompt judicial
review of HEW decisions. However, to the extent that the OASDI
and SSI judicial review provisions are considered exclusive, thereby
25 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1970) (OASDI); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (Supp. III, 1973) (SSI).There is
nojurisdictional-amount requirement in either of these sections.
26 Disability determinations turn upon complex fact issues, often involving detailed medi-

cal testimony. Such determinations can properly be made by a specialized administrative
hearing system which has acquired a degree of expertise in that particular field. Moreover, the
lengthy hearings on such complex fact questions would further clog the federal courts. In such
cases it seems more efficient to restrict judicial review to questions of law.
27 OASDI hearing fact-findings are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42
U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1970). The more recent SSI statute is somewhat more restrictive in permitting
judicial review of administrative hearings. SSI adopts the OASDI framework for review of
hearing decisions; however, all fact-findings of the Secretary are conclusive and are not subject
tojudicia review. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (Supp. I1, 1973).
2' Decisions of the Veterans' Administration as to any claim for veterans' benefits are final
and subject to no review by any other official or court. 38 U.S.C. § 211 (a) (Supp. III, 1973). But
see notes 30-35 and accompanying text infra.
29 OASDI provides for the following hierarchy of administrative decisions: initial determination, reconsideration, hearing, and review by the Appeals Council. Only after proceeding
through this administrative maze may the recipient obtaincourt review of an agency decision.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901-.990 (1974). SSI provides for a similar system of administrative review.
Proposed HEW Reg. §§ 416.1501-.1595, 38 Fed. Reg. 34,469-73 (1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1053-55,
1860-61, 5778-83, 34,060-62 (1974).
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necessitating exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is apparent
that such promptness may not be achieved.
A. Availability of Judicial Review
The Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Robison,30 has recently
suggested that no statute may preclude judicial review of constitutional questions. Plaintiff, a conscientious objector, sued the Veterans Administration for GI benefits that had been denied him
because he was not a veteran who had served on active duty.
Plaintiff alleged that such statutory discrimination against conscientious objectors was a violation of his first and fifth amendment
rights. As a threshold defense, the defendant Veterans Administration relied on a section of the Veterans Administration statute
which precluded court review of any final decision made by the
Administration. 3 ' The Supreme Court held that this statutory bar
could not operate against constitutional claims. First, the statute
did not expressly preclude constitutional claims, but barred only
review of agency decisions made pursuant to the statute itself.
Second, the agency could not be expected to adjudicate constitutional claims, since they were inherently beyond the scope of
administrative review. 32 Implicit in the Court's argument was the
need for judicial review in order to assess the constitutionality of
the statute itself, including the section in question. 33 But the Court
invalidated the section precluding judicial review with respect to
constitutional claims only and implied that the bar against review34
ing statutory claims was valid.
Although it seems clear that a statutory preclusion of judicial
review of administrative fact-finding is valid, 3 5 it is not clear how
far such statutory preclusion could be carried. The rationale of
Robison would forbid any preclusion where the litigant's challenge
was to the validity of a statutory provision. Thus, whenever the
underlying administrative review procedure is established pursuant
to an overall statutory scheme, the administrative body logically
30 415 U.S. 361 (1974).
31 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (Supp. III, 1973).
32 "Adjudication of the constitutionality of congressional enactments has generally been
thought beyond thejurisdiction of administrative agencies." 415 U.S. at 368, quoting Ostereich
v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33 The Court distinguished between review of a question of law or fact which arises under
the statute and review of a congressional decision embodied in the statute which arises under
the Constitution. Id. at 367.
" See id. at 368-74, where the Court discusses the rationale behind a 1970 amendment of
§ 211(a).
3' See 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (Supp. III, 1973) (SSI).
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lacks jurisdiction to examine the validity of the statute in question.
At present, however, the real problem for the welfare litigant is not
the ultimate availability of judicial review, but the timing of such
review.
B.

Timing of Judicial Review
In a recent case challenging the Social Security Act's alleged
discrimination against illegitimate children on equal protection
grounds, 36 HEW argued that the suit was premature under section
4 05(g) of the Social Security Act.3 7 The basis for this argument
was
the Agency's position that section 4 05(g), which provides for judicial review only of final agency decisions, was the exclusive means
for obtaining federal jurisdiction. 3 8 Accordingly, there could be no
judicial review until the individual claimant had exhausted all of
the administrative remedies provided by the Social Security Administration.3 9 But the court held that since the injunctive and
declaratory relief necessary to remedy this alleged constitutional
violation was beyond the scope of administrative review under the
statute, the court did not have to wait for the plaintiff to pursue
her administrative remedies. 40 This issue is presently one of the
most important threshold questions for welfare litigants.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a plaintiff who
brings a constitutional claim under the Civil Rights Act, section
1983, 4 1 need not exhaust administrative remedies. 42 However, the
significance of these cases is unclear because challenges of illegal
welfare practices under section 1983 arise only in the context of
state deprivations of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the Civil Rights Act was intended to provide a
remedy supplementary to any provided by the states.4 3 Thus, these
holdings may be limited'to situations where exhaustion would be
effected through state channels, and the rationale may be inapplicable to federal cases. A more reasonable reading, however, would
emphasize the inherent inability of administrative agencies to ques36 Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1973)

(scheme for reduction of children's benefits that eliminated all benefits for illegitimate children
before reducing those of legitimate children violated equal protection).
37 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970). This section provides forjudicial review in the district courts
of any final decision of HEW. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901-90 (1974).
38 Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Md. 1972).
39 See note 29 supra.
40
41
42

43

346 F. Supp. at 1230.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309,312 n.4 (1968); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
389 U.S. at 417, citing McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963).
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tion the constitutionality of their own statutory schemes. Any
constitutional challege should make exhaustion unnecessary, and
the rationale ofJohnson v. Robison44 supports such an approach. If
an administrative body is without jurisdiction to question the validity of its enabling statute, it would be useless to require the
administrative body to consider the question before permitting a
court to exercise the required judicial review: This simple test,
constitutional question or fact question, has been accepted by at

45
least two district courts.

However, when a plaintiff challenges illegal welfare practices
on statutory grounds, the doctrine of exbaustion is not susceptible
to any simple test. Some courts have distinguished between constitutional challenges to the validity of the statute, which do not
require exhaustion, and statutory challenges to the administration
of the plan, which do require exhaustion. 4 6 But the Supreme Court
has rejected this simplistic approach. In Rosado v. Wyman, 47 plaintiffs successfully challenged the New York State Department of
Social Services's method of computing AFDC benefits as violative
of section 402(a)(23) 4 8 of the Social Security Act. The Court noted
that plaintiffs did not seek to review an administrative order.49 The
majority opinon, however, did emphasize the plaintiffs' inability to
initiate conformity hearings, implying that the only way for plaintiffs to challenge this kind of agency decision was through judicial
channels.
Today, most courts approach the exhaustion question by considering several factors. First, exhaustion is not required if the
administrative remedy is wholly inadequate and the federal ques44 415 U.S. 361 (1974). See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra.
45 Where a plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of the statute under which an administrative agency acts, the attack does not turn upon a factual determination requiring administrative
expertise, and the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, therefore, does not apply.
Mattern v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 906, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also Salfi v. Weinberger, 373
F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
4' See Roane v. Weinberger, 1A UNEMPL. INS. REP.
17,663 (N.D. Cal. March 27, 1974)
(action to enjoin OASDI deductions from salaries); Metcalf v. Swank, 305 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (action to enjoin enforcement of shelter allowance maximum).
47 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970).
48 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1970).
49 In Rosado the plaintiffs challenged the New York State Department of Social Services's
decision to fix maximum AFDC allowances for each family and to eliminate all special grants.
This decision resulted in decreased benefit levels for many New York recipients. 397 U.S. at
415-19. Contrast this agency policy decision with the individual disability decisions discussed in
note 26supra. Although exhaustion seems proper in the latter case, it is futile in the former. The
decisions of the hearing officer are governed by the agency interpretations of the statute, which
are embodied in the regulations, and it is these very regulations that litigants often seek to
cballenge.
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tion is plainly presented to the court. 50 Second, exhaustion is not

required where it would cause irreparable harm to the litigant. 51
Against these factors the court should balance specialized administrative expertise. Where such expertise would be helpful to the
court in reviewing the question, exhaustion may be required to
52
allow the agency to present its views.
Application of this test in the welfare context will almost
always obviate exhaustion. Whether the challenge is to the statute

itself, or to the agency's own interpretation of the statute, the
administrative remedy is clearly inadequate. 53 Furthermore, since
the potential for irreparable injury is present in all welfare litigation, judicial review at the earliest possible time is always a
necessity. Under this analysis, exhaustion should never be required

for welfare litigants, except in cases of factual determinations on an
individual basis.
II
SECTION 1331-FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

The federal welfare litigant's most direct avenue to federal
court seems to be by way of federal question jurisdiction.5 4 There is
little doubt that federal welfare claims, whether constitutional or
statutory, arise under the constitution or laws of the United States.
As welfare becomes progressively federalized and state involve50 Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1125 (10th Cir. 1973); Frost v. Weinberger, 375
F. Supp. 1312, 1320 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 965 n.9 (D.
Hawaii 1974).
51 "Nor will exhaustion of administrative remedies be required where it would result in
irreparable harm. This is especially true where time is crucial to tbe protection of substantive
rights and administrative remedies would involve delay." Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d
1121, 1125 n.10 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312, 1320
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 965 n.9 (D. Hawaii 1974).
52 See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970). Professor Davis emphasizes these
three factors in suggesting a proposed guide to problems of exhaustion. K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TEXT § 20.03, at 387-88 (3d ed. 1972).
5' The agency's interpretation of the statute is embodied in the regulations that it promulgates. The agency's hearing officers are bound by such regulations and by general agency policy
decisions made pursuant to such regulations. It is useless to ask hearing officers to consider the
invalidity of their agency's own regulations. Furthermore, it is arguably beyond thejurisdiction
of such officers to challenge agency policy and regulations.
54 "The district courts shall have originaljurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $ 10,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and arises
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
The use of federal-question jurisdiction in welfare challenges to illegal state agency practices is discussed in Note, COLUM. L. REv., supra note 8, at 1428-35.
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ment decreases, the system becomes governed almost exclusively by
the Social Security Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 5 5 While such federal welfare claims clearly comport with the
language of section 1331 they must also overcome the $10,000
jurisdictional-amount requirement of that section. The harshness
of this requirement in the welfare context is obvious; $10,000 is
approximately six times the annual minimum benefit level for an
SSI recipient.5 6 It is almost impossible for any recipient to amass a
claim for over $10,000 in welfare benefits.
The traditional rationale behind the jurisdictional amount was
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 1974: "The jurisdictional
amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into
courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the
trial of petty controversies. '57 While the present jurisdictional
amount may achieve a proper balance between these two extremes
in cases involving traditional monetary disputes, the same cannot
be said in the welfare context-a simple dollar measurement of the
amount in controversy fails to reflect the seriousness of a welfare
dispute. For a subsistence recipient a reduction of assistance benefits carries the specter of inadequate food, clothing, shelter, and
health care. Furthermore, because welfare programs distribute
billions of dollars annually, there is a clear federal interest in seeing
58
that such large distributions are properly administered.
Nevertheless, the traditional approach to the jurisdictionalamount requirement has effectively foreclosed section 1331 litigation for welfare claimants. It has therefore become necessary to
bypass traditional doctrine, primarily through the use of two devices: (1) alternative measurement of the amount in controversy,
and (2) aggregation of claims in class actions. However, both of
these devices are at best unsatisfactory ad hoc solutions; there is a
need for statutory overhaul.
55 Although SSI federalized all adult welfare categories, the mandatory state supplementation has been held to be a significant factor in finding sufficient state involvement for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 254-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). See note 8 supra.
5' The annual federal SSI benefit for in individual without an eligible spouse was $1,752
for 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
57 Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1973), citing S. REP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958).
58 In fiscal 1974 the federal government was to distribute over $126 billion through 51
different welfare programs. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FISCAL POLICY, JOINT ECONOMIC CoMM.,
93D CONG., 1 ST SEss., How PUBLIC WELFARE BENEFITS ARE DISTRIBUTED IN LOW-INCOME AREAS
13-15 (Comm. Print 1974).
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Measurement of the Amount in Controversy
The prevailing rule is that the amount in controversy should
be determined from the viewpoint of potential benefit to the
plaintiff.59 Furthermore, "the collateral effect of the judgment in
other matters not directly involved in the pending suit cannot be
taken into consideration. ' 60 An important caveat to this rule,
however, is that the plaintiff need not prove the jurisdictional
amount. Dismissal for lack of jurisdictional amount is justified only
when it appears to a legal certainty that the claim is for less than
the jurisdictional amount.6 1 The interaction of these principles has
allowed the courts somewhat more flexibility than the strict
plaintiff-viewpoint rule would seem to justify.
Despite the contrary prevailing rule, some courts have openly
measured the amount in controversy by the monetary result to
either party. 62 For example, in a recent case challenging the
military surveillance of civilian political activity, the District of
Columbia Circuit stated that, in claims for injunctive relief, the
amount in controversy may be measured by the value of the relief
sought by plaintiff or the cost to defendant. 63 This approach
achieves the desired result of keeping trivial cases out of the
federal courts."
Rather than openly disregard the plaintiff-viewpoint rule,
many courts faced with the dilemma of measuring the extent of
constitutional deprivation in pecuniary terms have placed a per se
dollar value on the constitutional right itself, instead of concentrating on the fiscal harm suffered as a result of the constitutional
A.

See 1 J. MOORE, FEDERL PRACTICE
0.91[l] (1974); C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
§ 34 (1970).
60 1J.MooRE,supra note 59, 0.91[2], at 828-29. According to Moore, although a suit may
59

COURTS

work as an estoppel, or affect other actions or persons not parties to the instant suit, such
collateral effects do not increase the jurisdictional amount. Id. at 828-3 1.
61 St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938).
62 The most frequently cited authority for this principle is Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W. Ry.,
116 F.2d 604 (10th Cir. 1940).
63 Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 408 U.S.
1 (1972) (dictum). The court found jurisdiction based on the unique nature of the District of
Columbia courts. It has been held that the District of Columbia courts have general equity
jurisdiction where either party resides in the district. Id. at 950.
Tatum has been followed in a recent challenge to the new federal recoupment regulations.
45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(12) (1974). Since the court was satisfied that the amount in controversy
was over $10,000 for either plaintiff or defendant, federal question jurisdiction was satisfied.
NWRO v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1974). However, this approach was recently
rejected by the Northern District of California. Roane v. Weinberger, 1A UNEMPL. INS. REP.
17,663 n.2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1974).
64 See C. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 34, at 118-19.
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deprivation. For example, when an army enlisted man sought to
enjoin his transfer, which allegedly had resulted from his expression of dissent over the Vietnam war, the Eastern District of New
York, in Cortright v. Resor,65 found federal question jurisdiction
through an evaluation of the right infringed. Plaintiff's allegations
of first amendment violations seemed to be beyond monetary
measurement. But the court found that "free speech is almost by
definition, worth more than $10,000, so that the allegation of
'66
jurisdiction based upon 1331 ought not to be subject to denial.
The Third Circuit has applied the Cortright rationale to a case
involving a plaintiff's right to campaign for political office on an
army base. 67 A candid statement of this emerging principle of
federal jurisdiction appeared in a suit to recognize plaintiffs as the
governing body of an Indian tribe: "In that narrow spectrum of
civil rights suits against federal authorities which may not be
judicially cognizable except under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the value of
the civil right itself should be considered in determining the
'68
jurisdictional amount.
The Second Circuit has recently stated that, when the right in
question is not susceptible to dollar valuation, the court is without
federal-question jurisdiction to hear the case. 6 9 The court traced
this doctrine back to an 1847 Supreme Court holding.7 0 That case
was a custody suit, however, and the federal courts have always
declined to hear such cases, even when diversity jurisdiction has
65 325 F. Supp. 797 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
66Id. at 810. However, as mandamus was found to be an alternative basis for jurisdiction,
this language may only be dictum. Cortright was reversed on other grounds by the Second
Circuit, but the jurisdictional question was avoided because the government conceded mandamus jurisdiction. 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971).
67 Spock v. David, 469 F.2d 1047 (3d Cir. 1972),stay denied, 409 U.S. 971 (1972). Spock was
an action by political campaigners, who had been barred from entering Fort Dix, for an
injunction against further interference with their first amendment rights by the United States
Army. The court ordered that the time and place of such campaigning could be regulated by
the Army, but that plaintiffs could not be barred entirely from the military base.
The first Spock opinion was an appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction. Id. On
appeal after the final hearing on the injunction, the Third Circuit expressly reaffirmed the
jurisdictional point. Although the first amendment rights in question were intangible, they were
susceptible to dollar valuation. Their value exceeded the $10,000jurisdictional amount. Spock
v. David, 502 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1974).
68 McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629, 638 (D. Utah 1973).
69 Rosado v. Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970). See also
Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d 1395 (6th Cir.),cert.denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970). The courtin
Goldsmith refused to place a specific value on the right to distribute political literature on an army
base, and dismissed the case for lack of federal-question jurisdiction. Id.
70 Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103 (1847).
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been present. 71 Moreover, the Second Circuit's approach makes
little sense if the rationale behind jurisdictional amount is to keep
trivial cases out of the federal courts. Constitutional violations are
substantial enough to merit federal adjudication whenever they
occur.

72

Even so, the utility of this principle in welfare litigation is
unclear. Although all constitutional claims are amenable to the
same per se rule which applies to first amendment violations,
statutory claims are not necessarily of equal importance. It can be
argued, though, that benefit deprivations for welfare recipients
affect fundamental, if not constitutionally recognized, "rights." A
reduction or termination of a subsistence assistance grant clearly
affects the recipient's right to adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
health care. Measured in this manner, plaintiff's right should meet
the jurisdictional amount.
Another attempt to circumvent a rigid approach to the
amount in controversy focuses on indirect damages. Although
dismissal is only proper if it appears to a legal certainty that the
requisite amount is not present, 73 the plaintiff must tread a narrow
line between permissible allegations and impermissible allegations
of collateral effects. 74 For example, only the assistance benefits
sought by plaintiff, and not those of other recipients, are taken into
account. Also, courts have refused to permit plaintiffs to multiply
annual welfare benefits by future years of welfare eligibility to meet
the jurisdictional amount.7 5 Future welfare eligibility is regarded as
too speculative. But because welfare recipients live at the subsistence level or below, some courts have listened favorably to allegations of indirect damages resulting from benefit deprivations. The
"'

See C. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 25, at 84.

This rationale is implicit in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970), which authorizes federal
jurisdiction over all cases involving state deprivations of constitutional rights. See note 8 supra.
Section 1343(3) contains no jurisdictional amount. When the defendant is a federal officer,
however, the aggrieved party has no jurisdictional-basis analogue to § 1343(3). He is relegated
to general federal-question jurisdiction and must meet the jurisdictional amount. Note, however, that when the defendant is a federal officer or agency, there should he a greater federal
interest in federal adjudication of the suit. For a compelling statement of the need for federal
adjudication' of the federal deprivation of constitutional rights, see Fein v. Selective Service
System Local Bd. No. 7, 430 F.2d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 1970) (Lumbard, C. J., dissenting).
73 See St. Paul Mercury lndem. Co. v. Red Gab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
74 See note 60 and accompanying text supra. By analogy, in tax cases the amount in
controversy is only the amount of the tax in question and not the effect on future taxes nor
possible adverse effects on plaintiff's property. See 1 J. MOORE, supra note 59, 0.91[2], at
828-31.
75 Roane v. Weinberger, IA UNEMPL. INS. REP. 17,663 n.2 (N.D. Gal. March 27, 1974);
Rosado v. Wyman, 304 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (E.D.N.Y. 1969),rev'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969),
rev'd, 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
72
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Rosado76

district court in
accepted a good faith claim by plaintiffs
who alleged health complications caused by their marginal nutritional status and mental health problems resulting from constant
material deprivations. 7 7 Similarly, in a school lunch case, where
thirty-five cent lunches were denied to plaintiffs, a federal court,
after noting that the right to good health was involved, found
jurisdiction under section 1331 and decided that possible damages
resulting from the deprivation of these lunches were not too
speculative.7 8 Although allegations such as these, which focus on
the adverse consequences of welfare cutbacks, seem to have the
most potential for creative welfare litigants, they do not assure the
litigant a firm jurisdictional ground.
B. Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions
Enforcement considerations often lead welfare litigants to
bring class actions seeking to enjoin illegal agency practices. A
favorable decision benefits all members of the class and all recipients in a given jurisdiction. But the rules governing aggregation
of claims to meet the jurisdictional amount have prevented most
7 9
welfare litigants from surmounting this fiscal barrier.
In 1968, the Supreme Court was faced with the question of
when aggregation would be permissible under the new Rule 23.80
In Snyder v. Harris,8 1 the Court held that Rule 23 had not enlarged
the scope of federal jurisdiction, and that aggregation was still
permissible only when the several plaintiffs asserted a "common
and undivided interest" in the claim. 82 In the great majority of
cases, where plaintiffs' claims are separate and distinct, no aggregation is allowed. The Snyder Court found that the separate-anddistinct test was not inherently unworkable because the lower
courts had developed viable standards for distinguishing separate
and distinct claims from common and undivided claims. 83 Fur76 304 F. Supp. 1356, 1363 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 397 U.S.

397 (1970).
77 Although Rosado was reversed by the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court eventually
found jurisdiction based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). 397 U.S. at 403.
78 Marquez v. Hardin, 339 F. Supp. 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
79 For purposes of this discussion, unless otherwise noted, aggregation will be used to
mean only aggregation of several plaintiffs' claims against a common defendant.
8o Federal class action procedure is outlined in FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
81 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
82 Some examples ofa common and undivided interest are: distributees ofan estate suing
a converter of the estate; a wrongful death action brought by more than one beneficiary; and
creditors suing for insurance payable to their common debtor. These examples and others are
collected in C. WRIGHT,Supra note 59, § 36, at 122 n.8. It should be noted thataggregation is also
permissible when one plaintiff asserts several claims against one defendant. Id. at 12 1.
83 Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332,341 (1969). The Supreme Court's opinion that these two
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thermore, the Court felt that a different result would undermine the
basic jurisdictional amount rationale. This rationale sought to keep
two classes of cases out of the federal courts: trivial actions, and
aggregations of small state claims brought in diversity. These cases,
primarily involving questions of state law, properly belong in the
state courts and should not be permitted to congest the federal
system.
Justice Fortas, writing in dissent, noted the impact that this
holding would have on federal question cases. 84 Although the
majority focused its analysis on diversity policy, the impact of
Snyder on section 1331 cases would be to keep essentially federal
cases out of the federal courts. 85 In Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo.,8 6
the Court acknowledged this adverse impact on such cases and
held that each plaintiff with a separate and distinct claim in a class
action, and not only the named party plaintiff, must individually
satisfy the jurisdictional amount. Again, this was a diversity case,
and the Court limited its analysis of the rule to the diversity
context. However, the Court explicitly stated that the result would
have been the same with a federal question case. 87 Neither the
majority nor the dissent answered Justice Fortas's concerns.
By applying the separate-and-distinct test, most courts have
managed to deny aggregation in the welfare context. For example,
in an action seeking assistance benefits for strikers, aggregation of
claims to reach the jurisdictional amount was summarily denied by
the Second Circuit. 8 8 Likewise, the district court in Rosado forbade

aggregation of welfare claims with nothing more than a recital of
89
the Snyder test.

In the past few years, some courts have begun to permit
aggregation, first in medicaid cases and later in welfare cases, by
holding that class action plaintiffs met the common-andtests provide workable standards for the courts is not universally shared. "[t]he distinction
between a common undivided interest and several and distinct claims is something less than
dear." C. WRIGHT, supra note 59, § 36, at 122. More generally, Professor Wright finds that the
present law governing aggregation is plainly unsatisfactory and that the rules have evolved
haphazardly with little functional utility and even less basis in logic. He considers the distinction
between the two Snyder tests to be mystifying. Id. at 121-24.
84 394 U.S. at 342 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
'5 Id. at 342 n.2.
86 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
" Id. at 302 n.1 1. "Because a class action invoking general federal-question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 would be subject to the samejurisdictional-amount rules with respect to

plaintiffs having separate and distinct claims, the result here would be the same even if a cause
of action under federal law could be stated, or if suhstantive federal law were held to control this
case." Id. (citation omitted).
8 Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971).
8 304 F. Supp. at 1362.
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undivided-interest test. In the first such case, Bass v. Rockefeller,9"
plaintiffs brought a class action to enjoin a tightening of medicaid
eligibility standards. The court interpreted the traditional Snyder
test to permit aggregation when either of two tests was satisfied: (1)
"when the adversary of the class has no interest in how the claim is
to be distributed among the class members"; 91 or (2) "when none
of the class members could bring suit without directly affecting the
rights of his co-parties. ' 92 It was held that in the medicaid context
either test was satisfied. The court then analogized the suit to trust
cases where several beneficiaries would be allowed to aggregate
their claims when asserting a common interest in the proper
administration of a single trust fund. 93 In the medicaid program
the state was perceived as the trustee for all of the medically needy.
Consequently, the amount in controversy was not any sum specifically sought by the plaintiffs, but was rather the proposed
amount of state reduction in medicaid benefits. 94 Also, because this
action was not representative of either of the two classes of cases
which Snyder sought to exclude from the federal courts, trivial
lawsuits and minor state claims, the court was not compelled to
reach the result which was achieved in Snyder.
Recently, the Southern District of New York reaffirmed the
95
Bass approach and proposed a less mechanistic application of the
Snyder test. Focusing more on the rationale behind Snyder, the court
interpreted it to forbid aggregation only in trivial actions or in
actions that are primarily diversity cases. 9 6 The Bass approach has
97
subsequently been used to permit aggregation in both welfare
98
and social security cases.
90 331 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
91 Id. at 950.
92 Id.

93 Id. at 952.
94 "The sole concern of New York for purposes of this action is whether it must make
the fund available to the medically needy, and not how much of the fund each member of
the plaintiff class will ultimately receive." Id. at 951.
15 Bass v. Richardson, 338 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Bass v. Rockefeller, 331 F.
Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), was vacated as moot by the Second Circuit in Bass v. Rockefeller,
464 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1971), but came up again on a new claim iu Richardson.
96 338 F. Supp. at 482. The court then expressed a result-oriented view of federal
jurisdiction: "If any case is proper for adjudication of important federal rights and issues of
federal law by a federal court, it is this case." Id.
97 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C.
1974) (HEW recoupment regulations held invalid).
98 Mattern v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (suit to require Goldberg
procedures for OASDI terminations or reductions). Contra, Roane v. Weinberger, 1A
UNEMPL. INS. REP. 17,663 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 1974) (suit to enjoin OASDI deductions
from teachers' salaries).
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Although the policy rationale of Bass is sound, the court's
analogy to trust cases, upon which the common-and-undivided
approach is in part based, is obviously weak. Neither medicaid
beneficiaries nor welfare recipients have any vested interest in the
fund. Each much satisfy complex eligibility requirements, and the
size of the fund rests ultimately upon legislative whim under the
Social Security Act. Bass appears to be another expression of court
dissatisfaction with restrictive federal jurisdictional policy. If so, the
Bass approach provides the most promise for welfare litigants.
Unlike methods which circumvent restrictive federal jurisdiction,9 9
this approach accords with the established doctrine of the Supreme
Court as expressed in Snyder.
III
MANDAMUS JURISDICTION

In the absence of state action to establish jurisdiction under
section 1343, and without the requisite $10,000 amount in controversy under section 1331, the federal welfare or social security
litigant will want to establish jurisdiction under the mandamus
provisions of section 1361.100 Known as the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962,101 section 1361 extends two important powers to
federal district courts. First, it gives all district courts the power to
issue mandamus relief-to order federal officials to act consistently
with their duties imposed by federal law. 10 2 Second, it establishes
an independent basis of federal jurisdiction' 0 3 without regard to
10 4
the amount in controversy.
See notes 59-78 and accompanying text supra.
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970). "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or
any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Id.
101 For a legislative history of § 1361, see S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
102 Mandamus jurisdiction in the federal courts has a curious history. In 1813 the
Supreme Court, on the theory that a mandamus action was not a suit "of a civil nature at
common law or in equity," ruled that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not give the federal
courts jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus: M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504
(1813). In 1838, however, the Court took up the question again and decided that the Circuit
Court of the District of Columbia, as the inheritor of the common law power of the courts of
Maryland, had the power to issue a writ of mandamus to federal officers. Kendall v. United
States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838). See generally Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of
The Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"JudicialReview of FederalAdministrative
Action, 81 HARV. L. REv. 308 (1967).
13 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D.D.C.
1974); Peoples v. United States Dep.'t of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
104 Martinez v. Richardson, 472 F.2d 1121, 1125-26 (10th Cir. 1973).
:9

100
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Mandamus jurisdiction will lie whenever facts are alleged upon
which mandamus relief, in its traditional sense, should be
granted. 0 5 The rationale of mandamus jurisdiction is that any
federal official should be held accountable in a federal court for
injuries caused by a failure to act according to the responsibilities
imposed by federal law and his federal office.
0 6
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary form of relief'
which is granted as a matter of judicial discretion only in appropriate circumstances.10 7 To be judicially cognizable, a mandamus
cause of action must allege facts which show the following elements:
(1) a federal officer has a clear duty to perform the act in question, 0 8
(2) the claimant has a right to the relief sought, and (3) there is no
alternative remedy.' 0 9 Whether the official has a clear duty to perform the act in question is said to rest on its ministerial rather than
discretionary nature."10 In contrast to a discretionary function, a
ministerial act is the product of a simple and definite duty, imposed
by law, without regard to individual judgment as to the propriety of
the act being done. 1 I" To be ministerial, a duty must be equivalent to a
positive command.' 1 2 It must be specific, mandatory, plainly ascertainable, and free from doubt.1 1 3
105 Even though § 1361 refers to "any action in thenature ofmandamus" (emphasis added),
it is generally assumed that the Act was not intended to enlarge the scope of mandamus
jurisdiction. Thus, § 1361 jurisdiction requires the allegation of a mandamus claim good at
common law. Jarrett v. Resor, 426 F.2d 213, 216 (10th Cir. 1973). Some uncertainty has
nevertheless been expressed on this point. See Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir.
1973); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 967 (D. Hawaii 1974). See also Byse & Fiocca,
supra note 100.
106 Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970).
107 Id. at 773.

108 In addition to ordering the performance of a positive act, mandamus may be brought
to compel inaction, to require the exercise of a choice among alternatives, or to direct the
exercise of discretion, but not to determine the manner in which discretion is exercised. United
States exrel. McLennah v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414,420 (1931); Work v. United States exreL Rives,
267 U.S. 174, 177 (1925); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497,514-17 (1840); Casarino v.
United States, 431 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1970); Clackamus County v. McKay, 219 F.2d 479 (D.C.
Cir. 1954), vacatedasmoot,349 U.S. 909 (1944); Guffanti v. Hershey, 296 F. Supp. 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Mandamus is also appropriate to correct an abuse of discretion. United States ex rel.
Schonbrun v. Commanding Officer, 403 F.2d 371,374 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 929
(1960); L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 181-82 (1965).

109 Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 773 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 941 (1970).
110 ICC v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 287 U.S. 178,204 (1932); Wilbur v. United States ex

rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 218 (1930); Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 881 n.8 (4th Cir. 1973);
Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Walker, 409 F.2d
477, 481 (9th Cir. 1969).
"'
Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 231 (1900).
112 Switzerland Co. v. Udall, 225 F. Supp. 812 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 337 F.2d 56 (4th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
13 Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844,849 (3d Cir. 1972),cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955
(1973); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1974).
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Despite these guidelines, the ministerial-discretionary distinction is an imprecise method for determining whether mandamus
relief is appropriate. Moreover, the history of the mandamus concept,1 14 and the technical rules that govern it, have generated considerable confusion as to the basis for establishing jurisdiction under
section 1361. Currently, three problems common to section 1361
jurisdictional questions must be resolved before a more consistent
analytical approach towards mandamus cases can be developed.
A.

Mandamus Jurisdiction and Mandamus Relief
Questions of law, as well as issues of fact, must be decided
after a court has assumed jurisdiction over a controversy. 115 To
avoid the temptation of deciding substantive issues by dismissing
claims for want of jurisdiction, it has long been federal practice to
accept at face value the allegations in the complaint, and to give
them their natural jurisdictional consequences "unless they are so
transparently insubstantial or frivolous as to afford no possible
basis for jurisdiction."1' 16 Thus, each of the three elements of
mandamus action must be alleged in a nonfrivolous manner to
establish jurisdiction under section 1361.117 Yet recent federal
court decisions, involving constitutional questions under the first,
fifth, and fourteenth amendments, indicate that a different standard, one similar to the more exacting rule applied to a motion for
summary judgment, is being applied where jurisdiction rests principally on section 1361.
In the past two years, six federal district courts have considered whether a social security recipient has a right to a hearing
M14
See

Byse & Fiocca, supra note 102.

115 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
116 Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767, 770 (5th Cir. 1969).
117 The Supreme Court in Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974), reaffirmed the substan-

tiality doctrine as a statement ofjurisdictional principle. Hagansinvolved statutory and constitutional challenges to a New York Social Services Regulation concerning recoupment of public
assistance. See Note, The Outlook For Welfare LitigationIn The FederalCourts: Hagans v. Lavine &
Edelman v.Jordon, 60 ComLL L REv. 897, 900-03 (1975). Although the jurisdictional argument
in Hagans involved the sufficiency of an equal protection claim under § 1343(3), the reasoning is
equally applicable to the sufficiency ofjurisdiction under § 1361 for mandamus relief. In each
instance, the substantiality of the claim must be established before the court invokesjurisdiction.
The Hagans court stated that the petitioners' constitutional claim was not so attenuated and

insubstantial as to be devoid of merit. 415 U.S. at 539. However, the constitutional claims were
very questionable. See id. at 554 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Hagans v. Wyman, 471 F.2d 347,
349 (1973). lnHagansthe Supreme Court established a very minimal standard of substantiality
when there was no other jurisdictional basis that would permit a federal court to hear the
pendent federal question. Thus, the traditional elements of a mandamus claim, although they
must be alleged and must not be "wholly insubstantial" or "obviously frivolous," should be
measured by a flexible standard when considering jurisdiction. 415 U.S. at 537.
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before his benefits are reduced or terminated."" On four occasions
the courts ruled that the claimants had a fifth amendment right to
a Goldberg-type hearing prior to agency action; 1 19 in each instance,
jurisdiction was found under section 1361.120 However, injamieson
v. Weinberger12 1 and Knuckles v. Weinberger,1 22 contrary decisions
were rendered as the courts rejected both the propriety of maintaining the action under section 1361 and the existence of a
substantive right to a prereduction hearing. The nearly perfect
correlation between the substantive and jurisdictional findings in
these decisions and other mandamus cases 123 suggests a departure
from the traditional two-tiered approach, and suggests that a
litigant's right to be in a federal forum may rest on a court's
predilection towards accepting the substantive constitutional and
statutory arguments that the plaintiff is asserting. In Knuckles and
Jamieson, there may have been some basis for distinguishing a
reduction of social security benefits from a reduction of welfare
benefits. Such a distinction might trigger Goldberg due process
protections only in the welfare context, and not in the Social
Security context since the latter is not need-based. 24 However,
118 Jamieson v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Mattern v. Weinberger, 377
F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Frost v.
Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D.
Hawaii 1974); Knuckles v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Cal. 1973). Lyons involved the
right of a recipient in the newly established SSI program to a hearing before reduction of
benefits, while the five other cases involved Social Security recipients. All six cases were brought
without exhausting administrative remedies, and as a result statutory judicial review was not
available. See note 25 supra.
119 Mattern v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F.
Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Frost v. Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 1312 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); Elliott v.
Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974).
120 ElliottandMatternfoundjurisdiction under § 1361 only, withMattern explidty rejecting
the "shotgun" approach. See note 23 and accompanying text supra. Frost and Lyons found
jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act. See note 24 supra. Frost also found
jurisdiction under § 1331, while Lyons considered § 1343 to provide an additional basis for
jurisdiction.
121 379 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
122 371 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
123 See notes 8-10supra.

124Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), was a welfare case. The plaintiffs in that action
were New York recipients of AFDC and Home Relief. In holding that plaintiffs were entitled to
due process protections (notice and a prior hearing) before their benefits were terminated, the
Court focused on the "brutal need" of the recipients. Id. at 261, 264-66. As Social Security is not
need-based, however, it could be argued that Goldberg-type due process protections are not
necessary under the Social Security Act. A more realistic approach would not draw a distinction
of constitutional dimension, however, because for those recipients who have no income other
than their Social Security benefits, there is no less need present. Even if fullGoldberg procedures
do not attach, HEW should at least provide a prereduction hearing to decide if the recipient is
needy and, therefore, ifGoldberg restrictions are required in the piarticular case.
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factual distinctions do not explain the court's failure to find jurisdiction under section 1361. In both cases it was uncontroverted
that the Social Security Administration did not provide prereducion hearings, 2 5 nor could it be questioned that the agency had a
duty to respect its recipients' fifth amendment rights. Under Hagans v. Lavine,12 6 the only remaining jurisdictional question is
whether the fifth amendment right to a Goldberg hearing is so
wholly inapplicable to the fact pattern presented as to render the
claim frivolous and insubstantial. 12 7 On this basis, it would seem
that neither Knuckles nor Jamieson presented insubstantial claims,
and accordingly jurisdiction under section 1361 should have been
recognized in each instance.' 28 Instead, the jurisdictional and substantive issues were somehow blurred, and access to the federal
courts was denied.
B.

The Ministerial-DiscretionaryDistinction

To conform with the requirements of the mandamus tradition,
welfare litigants uniformly attempt to characterize the duty of a
federal official as mandatory rather than discretionary. 29 Since
most statutory and constitutional duties have both mandatory and
discretionary aspects, 30 dismissals for want of a ministerial duty
can be avoided only by phrasing the obligation of the federal
125 Jamiesor v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 28,33 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Knuckles v. Weinberger,
371 F. Supp. 565, 566 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
126 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
127 See note 117 supra.
128A first amendment case, representative of the same fuzzy analysis asJamieson and
Knuckles, is Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972). In Yahr it was decided that the court
lacked jurisdiction to compel plaintiff's commanding officer to cease interfering with the
plaintiff's first amendment right of association (specifically, his right to attend public meetings).
The court's analysis vacillated between the merits and thejurisdictional issue throughout. Even
if the court were hesitant to concede that a serviceman has a full right of association, it should
have decided the issue as a matter of substantive law. Unless the court intended to say that the
commanding officer had no duty to respect the rights of a serviceman under his command, the
action should not have been dismissed for lack ofjurisdictiori.
129 See notes 108-14 and accompanying textsupra.
130 Work v. United States ex tel. Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925).

Mandamus issues to compel an officer to peRiorm a purely ministerial duty. It can
not be used to compel or control a duty in the discharge of which by law he is given
discretion. The duty may be discretionary within limits. He cannot transgress those
limits, and if he does so, he may be controlled by injunction or mandamus to keep
within them. The power of the Court to intervene, if at all, thus depends upon what
statutory discretion he has. Under some statutes, the discretion extends to a final
construction by the officer of the statute he is executing. No court in such a case can
control by mandamus his interpretation, even if it may think it erroneous. The cases
range, therefore, from such wide discretion as thatjust described to cases where the

duty is purely ministerial, where the officer can do only one thing, which on refusal he
may be compelled to do.
Id. at 177.
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official in the most unequivocal, nondiscretionary manner. Where
constitutional rights are involved, it is sufficient to assert that the
defendant has a ministerial duty not to violate the plaintiff's
constitutional rights. 13 1 In Langevin v. Chenango Court Inc.,132 for
example, the assertion that a Federal Housing Administration rent
increase, without a prior hearing, violated the fifth amendment
due process clause was a sufficient allegation of jurisdiction under
section 136I. 133 In a statutory context, it has been held that the
failure of the Secretary of HEW to promulgate regulations consistent with the Social Security Act is a violation of a ministerial duty,
1 34
and therefore a sufficient allegation of section 1361 jurisdiction.
C.

The "ClearDuty" Requirement

The cases which have denied jurisdiction under the mandamus
provisions have implicitly suggested that the complexity of the ultimate issues is a relevant factor in determining whether the court has
subject matterjurisdiction. Inevitably, these decisions have given rise
to the inference that mandamus is proper only in what may be
characterized as the "easy" cases.1 35 If this is the actual basis underlying the clear duty element of a mandamus claim, it will severely limit
the usefulness of section 1361 whenever the duty is "unclear" because
the extent or nature of a constitutional right is in issue. Despite this
interpretation, it has been established that mandamus questions
should be liberally construed in cases charging violations of constitu' Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877, 880 (4th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108
(9th Cir. 1972); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974). The court in Elliott
found mandamus to require: (1) a dear duty on the part of the defendant to do the act, and (2) a
lack of another adequate remedy. "Moreover, the first and second requirements are met when
the application of a Supreme Court ruling to the instant case clearly shows the existence of
plaintiff's constitutional right and its denial by the defendant." Id. at 968.
132 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971).
131 See also Walker v. Blackwell, 360 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1966) (prison warden's interference
with prisoner's freedom of religion adequate jurisdictional allegation under § 1361).
"3 National Welfare Rights Organization v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 861, 867 (D.D.C.
1974).
135 Jamieson v. Weinberger, 379 F. Supp. 28 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Knuckles v. Weinberger, 371
F. Supp. 565 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Yahr v. Resor, 339 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.C. 1972). As the court in
Jamiesonstated:
I do not believe that the performance that the plaintiff seeks here is the kind of duty
that can be said to be a clear, plain, ministerial command that is envisioned in the
concept ofmandamus.... [1]n the case before us, the duty of the Administration is not
plainly prescribed by the Constitution.... [The case turns on whether there is a
constitutional duty upon the Administration to make available to plaintiff the opportunity for a preadjustment oral hearing. The question is not free from doubt.
379 F. Supp. at 34.
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tional rights. 136 The constitutional duty asserted must only be
sufficiently apparent to survive a dismissal as insubstantial. 137 Such a
judgment cannot be made in a vacuum; 138 therefore, all relevant
legislative and regulatory materials must be considered to determine
the extent of the right asserted and the scope of the discretion which
has been delegated to the federal official.1 3 9 Mandamus jurisdiction
will lie where the duty becomes "dear" after construction, analysis,
and interpretation of the relevant case law, constitutional provisions,
and statutory language.1 40 It is not necessary that there be a Supreme
Court decision directly in point to establish a clear constitutional duty
for section 1361 purposes.1 41 Furthermore, jurisdiction is not defeated simply because another district court viewed the constitutional
duty alleged as unclear. 142 Ultimately a judge must exercise his own
discretion, and if he sees the duty as clear,jurisdiction is appropriate
1 43
despite the existence of reasonable viewpoints to the contrary.
CONCLUSION

From the perspective of the social security or federal welfare
litigant, the law of federal jurisdiction is chaotic. Despite compelling
reasons for federal adjudication of federal welfare claims, there is no
jurisdictional provision which guarantees that these cases will be
given access to the federal courts. A fundamental unfairness has
resulted from this situation. The right of a poor person to have
federal statutory and constitutional claims heard in federal court
rests largely on the discretion of a district courtjudge. Although some
loopholes have been developed to permit section 1331 jurisdiction,
they are not imbedded firmly enough in the law of federal jurisdiction to offer solace to this class of litigants. When there is no loophole,
there is a strong possibility of a preliminary determination of the
merits before the jurisdictional question is addressed. Theoretically,
jurisdiction is present in a given case as a matter of right or not at all. It
136 United States v. Richardson, 365 F.2d 844, 851 (3d Cir. 1972); Fifth Avenue Peace
Parade Comm. v. Hoover, 327 F. Supp. 238, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). "[T]here are occasions of
deprivations of constitutional rights where satisfaction of the mandamus requirements might
be viewed liberally ....
327 F. Supp. at 243.
137 See note 117 supra.

Mattern v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
139 Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 494 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1974).
140 Careyv. Local Bd. No. 2,297 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn.),aft'd, 412 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1969).
141 Burnett v. Tolson, 474 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1973); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th
Cir. 1973); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960, 968 n.24 (D. Hawaii 1974).
142 371 F. Supp. at 968.
143 LJAFFE, supra note 108, at 184.
138
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is disturbing when the merits of a claim are submerged in the issue of
the claimant's right to be in a federal forum. This problem is especially acute wherejurisdiction is based upon section 1361 because the
court must evaluate the substantive right involved when it determines
the extent of the duty owed to the plaintiff. To date, many courts have
confused the jdrisdictional and underlying substantive issues.
Absent a legislative reform of Title 28,144 the welfare litigant
suing a federal officer must live with a patchwork approach to federal
jurisdiction and the realization that the right to a federal forum is a
matter of judicial discretion. Until jurisdictional reform is achieved,
society's poor will remain vulnerable to illegal and unconstitutional
actions of the federal government which are beyond the reach of the
federal courts.
John Kelly
David Rothenberg
* The American Law Institute's proposal for reform of federal-question jurisdiction
would obviate much of the foregoing discussion. AMERICAN LIAW INSTITUTE STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDFAL COURTS 172 (1969).

